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"THOU SHALT NOT RATION JUSTICE":
THE LAW AND THE POOR MAN
IN THE SIXTIES
Marshall S. Shapot
I
THE BACKGROUND

Some of the crucial questions dealing with the prevention of injustice in our system concerning the legal rights of poor Americans
are in many respects rather different questions than the ones that were
being raised in the 1930's. When my parents became engaged the day
after Roosevelt closed the banks, when in the same year my father
was writing a Note in the Temple Law Quarterly on housing legislation,' discussions of the kinds of issues raised today about law and
poverty would have seemed fantasies to most lawyers. But waves of new
events have produced different challenges to our legal system.
The legal problems of the poor begin and end with hunger and
degradation and are tangled with politics, ancient rules, and the electronic promises of Utopia. In a memorable passage, Schlesinger describes November of 1930: the apple peddlers on the street corners;
mining families living on beans without salt or fat; men on the lower
level of Chicago's Wacker Drive, feeding night fires with stray pieces
of wood while automobiles sped along above, "bearing well-fed men to
warm and well-lit homes. '2 The invitation of a white southern doctor,
issued in hearings in 1967, made it painfully evident that the misery
of the 1930's had not faded:
[Let] Senators Eastland and Stennis ...come with me into the
vast farmlands of the Delta, and I will show them the children of
whom we have spoken. I will show them their bright eyes and in-

nocent faces, their shriveled arms and swollen bellies, their sickness, and pain, and the misery of their parents.3
t Professor of Law, University of Texas School of law; Visiting Professor of Law,
University of Virginia. A.B. 1958, LL.B. 1964, University of Miami; A.M. 1961, Harvard
University. This essay was substantially delivered as a talk to the Law Library Institute
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on June 2, 1969.
1 Note, Recent Trends in Housing Legislation, 8 TmuP. L.Q. 99 (1933).
2 A. SCHL.SINGER, JR., THE AGE OF RoosEvELT: THE C~isis Or THE OLD ORDER 168
(1957).
3 N.Y. Times, July 16, 1967, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 3, col. 1.
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The team of doctors of which he was a member suggested that "'malnutrition' is not quite what we found; the boys and girls we saw were
hungry-weak, in pain, sick .

. ..

They are suffering from hunger

and disease and directly or indirectly, they are dying from themwhich is exactly what 'starvation' means." 4
One of the two most outstanding documents in the history of poverty in America in this decade was Michael Harrington's little book,
The Other America.5 Its memorable snapshot of the migrant mother
breast-feeding her four-year-old because it was the only food she had
for him is, as he says, eerily reminiscent of the final scene of the
Grapes of Wrath. But Harrington's book was more than a chronicle
of starvation. It was a story of hopeless and despairing people who
were being left in the exhaust of the splendid vehicles rolling along
the Wacker Drives of America. His picture of the unemployment
rates of black Americans, of psyches driven by the tensions of being
poor in a society of growing wealth, and of the final drain on the dignity of welfare clients by the probing of the caseworker is said to
have moved a new President of the United States to declare "war on
poverty."
The progress of the 1960's has produced a better world for many
residents of The Other America. As he left the post of Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, Wibur Cohen claimed that the forty
million people living in poverty in 1960-Harrington's minimum
figure in 1962-had been reduced to perhaps twenty-two million by
the opening of 1969.0 Even this figure, however, places more than one
American in ten below the line of poverty, and a second fundamental
document in the recent intellectual history of the subject reflects one
terrible harvest of these statistics. The Report of the NationalAdvisory
Commission on Civil Disorders dealt with 164 occurrences of urban upheaval in a nine-month period in 1967. The eight classified as "major"
invoke the names of great cities as labels for horror and violence; the
names of Newark and Detroit are permanent symbols of the tensions
of poverty becoming unbearable. Although the Riot Commission made
a general indictment of "white racism," it is its particularization of
life in black urban America that compels the attention of those who
seek to understand the problems of law and poverty in the United
States. Among the problems spotlighted by the Commission were the
4 Id.
5 M. HARRIN"TON, THE OTaEm AMERICA (Penguin ed. 1963).

6 Cohen, A Ten-Point Program to Abolish Poverty, 31 SocIAL SEcumrTy BuLL., Dec.
1968, at 8.
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disproportionate crime rates in the core cities, a condition that contributes mightily to the residents' insecurity.7 The inflated prices that
urban blacks pay for their groceries, which rise even more on the days
when welfare checks arrive; the bleak story of unemployment, underemployment, and educational deprivation; the awful rates of infant
mortality; and again the degrading aspects of "The Welfare'-all these
were made by the Commission to pass like grim horsemen before the
reader.
The reason for recounting this melancholy listing even in brief
fashion is to observe that each of these issues is closely tied to some
legal doctrine, some statutory command or deficiency, or some policy
of societal appropriation. In short, a great many of the problems of
the poor are essentially "legal" problems at a time when government is
increasingly dependent on a feeling among its citizens that they have
rights that are vindicable. It is therefore critical what kinds of legal
services are provided to underprivileged Americans.
II
Tim PooR MAN AND LEGAL SERVICES

The idea of providing free legal aid for poor people arose before
1900, but only about 50,000 people had benefited thereby by the end of
World War I. The greatest figure in the Legal Aid movement before
the "War on Poverty" was Reginald Heber Smith, whose book Justice
and the Poor, published in 1919, is a landmark in any bibliographical
history of the subject. The impetus provided by Smith and other distinguished Americans led to increased legal aid over the next decades,
particularly in the years after World War 11.8
In the sixties a quantum leap took place. A bellwether in this
development was the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,9 which recognized a federal constitutional standard requiring
legal representation of indigent defendants in felony trials. Subsequent
cases have spelled out this right to counsel in criminal matters in
greater and well-publicized detail.
7 Paradoxically, the Commission pointed also to the "deep hostility" between police
and residents. REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 135 (1968).

8 Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty Program, 31 LA-w & CONTEMP.
PROB. 211, 212 (1966).

9 872 U.S. 385 (1963). Cf. the latest authoritative pronouncement in the legal services
area, Johnson v. Avery, 393 US. 483 (1969) (unless state provides reasonable alternative,
it may not validly enforce regulation barring inmates from furnishing assistance to other
prisoners in preparing petitions for post-conviction relief).
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Partly as a result of judicial concern with the right to counsel,
various scholarly essays began to lay bare the facts on-how the legal
system discriminates against the poor in many cases all over the legal
spectrum. One of the most brilliant treatments was written by the late,
blind Berkeley scholar, Jacobus tenBroek, who argued compellingly
that California had built up over the last century what was truly a "dual
system of family law"-one set of laws for the main body of its citizens,
and another for those who were poor.10 Another factor in the growth of
legal services was a remarkable article, "The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective," by a pair of young Yale lawyers, Edgar and Jean
Cahn.:" The Cahns recognized the necessity for the traditional kinds
of legal aid-securing divorces for those whose married lives were torn
irreparably, raising champions for individual tenants opposing landlords who refused them heat because of refusal to comply with illegal
demands, and defending the poor against loan sharks. For them, however, the poor needed much more in the way of legal services than
specific law suits in trial courts. The article emphasized the possibilities
for law reform achieved by appellate litigation aimed at the nullification of unequal laws or unfair regulations, by negotiation on behalf of
groups of poor people seeking a fairer share of municipal services,
and in general by communicating to poor communities a sense of their
rights under the law.
The Cahns and their article helped guide the construction of the
Office of Economic Opportunity's legal services program, which today
embraces more than 700 neighborhood law offices. In 1968 these offices
extended legal services, ranging routinely from representation of individuals in divorce cases to unspectacular landlord-tenant and installment sales litigation, in 500,000 cases. 2 In fiscal 1967 neighborhood
lawyers won two-thirds of the appeals they filed, averted or won stays
of eighty-six percent of eviction cases, and achieved reversals in sixty3
two percent of hearings involving cut-offs of public assistance.' It
should be emphasized that all this legal service was free, and that
these lopsided percentages represent abstract rights that never would
have been realized without that service. Beyond this routine litigation,
these offices, as well as related groups of like-minded lawyers, already
have begun to chalk up successes in cases with great quantitative sig10 tenBroek, California'sDual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and
Present Status, 16 STAr. L. REv. 257, 900 (1964); id. at 17 STAN. L. REv. 614 (1965).
11 E. Cahn & J. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J.
1317 (1964).
12 OEO Release, Jan. 7, 1969, at 5.
13 OEO Release, Dec. 17, 1967, at 2...
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nificance. Typical of this kind of case is King v. Smith, 14 decided by
the Supreme Court in June 1968. The plaintiff in that case was Mrs.
Sylvester Smith, a mother of four. She had been receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children, a major public assistance category financed mostly by the federal government, but administered primarily
by the states. The Alabama Board of Pensions and Security, which
oversaw the program for the state, had adopted a regulation ostensibly
designed to discourage immorality in general and the production of
illegitimate children in particular. The federal statute setting up the
program granted aid to children who were "deprived of parental support," but the Alabama agency barred them from assistance if they had
a "substitute father." This term was defined to include, among other
things, men who did "not frequent the home but cohabit[ed] with the
child's natural or adoptive mother elsewhere." Under this regulation
the state barred Mrs. Smith from aid because of her alleged intimacy
with Mr. Williams, the father of nine children himself, who lived with
his wife and family but allegedly visited Mrs. Smith on the weekends.
Despite the clear lack of any obligation of Mr. Williams to support
Mrs. Smith, Alabama applied its regulation to their alleged weekend
trysts and denied benefits.15 On appeal the Supreme Court held that
Alabama's substitute father regulation conflicted with the purpose of
the Social Security Act and invalidated it. Another example is Levy v.
Louisiana. 6 There, suit was brought on behalf of five illegitimate
children for their mother's death and her pain and suffering caused by
injuries alleged to have been tortiously inflicted. Every American state
has statutes which allow suits by various relations-including "children"-for "wrongful death" and "survivar' damages. The Louisiana
courts, however, had dismissed the Levy suit on the ground that "child"
in the Louisiana death statute meant "legitimate child." The Supreme
Court reversed, holding this classification to be a denial of equal pro17
tection.
Several points may be made in connection with cases like these.
One is that the legislation and thought of the sixties have produced
lawyers who will take indigents' cases like Mrs. Smith's into all the
14 392 US. 309 (1968).
15 It might be pointed out that Mrs. Smith hardly fits what one suspects must have
been Alabama's stereotype: she worked for a living--or at least, she worked, although
how much of a living she earned was debatable. Her salary was between $16 and $20 a
week for a 3:30 a.m. to noon shift as a cook and waitress. Id. at 315.
16 391 US. 68 (1968).
17 In a companion case, the Court held it a denial of equal protection to bar a
mother's suit for the death of her illegitimate son. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 US. 73 (1968).
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courts of the land. Another is that King v. Smith and Levy v. Louisiana
are decisions with considerable effect beyond restoring to Mrs. Smith
her A.F.D.C. allotment and obtaining damages for the Levy children.
Indeed, they are reverberating yet throughout state welfare departments and have raised even fresher issues for attorneys concerned with
legal representation of the poor. Still another.is that lawyers and judges
are resting no longer on the ancient conventions of what constitutes
"legal materials." Poverty litigation presents subtle relationships in all
areas of the humanities, because it involves allocations of funds that
are not unlimited, strands of slightly veiled racism, the needs of individuals for affection and gratification, and the great intellectual problems presented by the attempt to make "cooperative federalism" work.
In Smith the Supreme Court cited books and articles on the theory
and background of public assistance programs, mostly for historical
purposes; and judges in the future may draw much more heavily on
"non-legal" literature, including that of the psychotherapeutic disciplines, economics, and political science, to solve this kind of case. For
example, resort to such references seems necessary if courts are adequately to spell out the premises as to the nature of family life implicit
in Justice Douglas's opinion in Levy.
Even after these successes, however, the viability of a legal services
program has been challenged. Just two years after they had inspired
the program, the redoubtable Cahns questioned whether the poor did
not need a substantially modified legal system rather than better access
to the existing one.-8 Positing an "inflation" that was operating to
drive the price of justice even farther beyond the ability of the poor to
afford it, they argued that the middle class had developed a "network
of privately negotiated consensual agreements" which served to minimize its contact with lawyers, noting that as a last resort either side
could threaten to hire a lawyer and "utilize all the law's subtlety, delay,
refinement, insensitivity and winner-take-all principle to vitiate the
worth of victory for either side."' 9 Abjuring faith that just providing
more and more lawyers for the poor would solve these problems, they
made several new and far-ranging proposals, the central one being the
creation of a neighborhood court system manned primarily by neigh18 New legal service programs for the poor cannot . . .rest with providing the
poor with greater opportunity to use a legal system which the middle class has
found to be obsolete, cumbersome-and too expensive in monetary, psychological

and temporal terms.
E. Cahn & J. Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NomTR
DAum LAw. 927, 937 (1966). Compare the recently expressed view of a distinguished
jurist, no more sanguine in tone. Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. Times,
March 9, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
19 Cahn, supra note 18, at 938.
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borhood residents. 20 They envisioned tribunals that would have the
power to make investigations and decisions on a wide range of problems of great significance to poor people, ranging from allegations that
policemen were revoking licenses unfairly to charges that school principals were submitting budget requests that were insufficient for hot
21
lunches and recreational equipment as well as educational materials.
For some at work in the field, however, the Calms' brilliance had
outrun the potential of politics; in any event, it seemed irrelevant to
the immediate pounding of the caseload upon their doors. For Brian
Olmstead, a District of Columbia neighborhood lawyer, legal services
was not a matter of dealing with "ultimate issues," but of "attempting
to get the most minimal concept of law to have some relation to reality."
Even in the application of established law in individual cases, the
hurdles seemed gigantic. A federal court of appeals had held that unconscionability could be used as a defense in contract cases; 22 but, said
Olmstead, "[Y]ou go into court on the cesspool level at which we practice.., you talk about unconscionability, and the answer of the judge
is, 'Don't give me that liberal garbage.' "23
This antinomy between those who theorize about legal services
and those who purvey them characterizes much of the debate over the
direction of legal services. Many are prone to sneer at "putting the
band-aid" on grave social illnesses. For those in the offices, however,
pressed by the father stricken with bleeding ulcers, his tubercular wife
who yet wants work, and the specter of their starving child-all
about to be evicted from their wretched apartment-it is enough to
keep a roof over their heads. It is not practical to discuss ultimate
solutions.2 '
20 Id. at 950-55.

21 For a review of a subsequent reiteration of this approach by the Calms see Shapo,
Book Review, 62 LAw L. J. 107 (1969). To round out one aspect of the history of this
subject, it should be noted that the original architects of the legal services program
have set out a brilliant extension of their probe of institutional frameworks aimed at

securing for the poor greater participation in our democracy. The Calms, using as a
springboard the cut-off of federal funds to a Mississippi poverty program under severe
political attack within the State, have suggested the creation of private "citizens advocate
centers" to check the development of the "new sovereign immunity" inherent in abuses of
bureaucratic power. E. Cahn &J. Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARV. L. REV.
929 (1968). See also the contributions to the Symposium in I CONN. L. REv. 201 (1968).
22 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23 PROCEEDINGS OF THE HARvARD CONFERENCE ON LAw AND POVERTY 40 (1967).
24 The illustration is no composite hypothetical, but a real case described to me
recently by a former neighqlq.
qq.1 lawyer in the nation's capital. It is not a picture
unique in its horror.
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III
THE ISSUES OF THE SIXTIES

No issues are more significant in poverty law than those dealing
with welfare, for welfare may be called the quintessential law of the poor.
All citizens at one time or another face problems dealing with the legal
rules governing real property and with the law merchant, but only for
the poor-by-definition is "The Welfare" a part of their daily lives. 25
The Supreme Court's decision on the "man in the house" in King v.
Smith 20 has produced great repercussions in the chambers of current
legal history, and the state welfare agencies charged with administration of the A.F.D.C. program have not been making a joyful noise
about it. Accepting the decision that they cannot bar a family entirely
from benefits because of the mother's occasional intercourse with a
continuing partner, the agencies have begun to probe other possibilities. Does he contribute on a regular basis to her groceries? If so,
should not that payment be deducted from her check, despite the fact
that he is in no way legally obligated for her support or that of her
children?2 7 How significant is the length of their relationship or his
"fatherly" interest in her children when they do not hold themselves
out to the community as being married? And other questions are being
put before the courts. The Supreme Court recently struck down state
requirements that welfare applicants must reside within the jurisdiction for at least one year to be eligible for benefits. 28 Still other dockets
include questions like these: May a state impose maxima on the amount
of grants to families with more than a stated number of children? How
much must the state take into consideration the actual cost of necessaries in figuring the size of grants? When and how may it legally cut
off payments, even if a hearing procedure is granted?
These problems involve difficult questions of statutory interpretation and constitutional law, and require careful investigation of
social, economic, and political realities. These difficulties were brought
home to me with special force at a hearing of the Texas Welfare Appeals Board two years ago. The members of that board impressed me
as decent, able people, well grounded in the daily problems of disburs25 Cf. Friedman, Social Welfare Legislation: An Introduction, 21 STAN. L. REv. 217
(1969).
20 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
27 Cf. Lewis v. Stark, 2 CCH 1969 Pov. L. REP.
9299 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1968)
(mem. opinion) (benefits denied under California's "Man Assuming the Role of Spouse"
provision).
28 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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ing limited funds to people on the verge of starvation, and seasoned in
the atmosphere of state politics. Dealing with a "man in the house"
case rather more difficult than King v. Smith, their questions reflected
considerable anxiety about the possible effects of a decision in favor
of the recipient. They seemed genuinely committed to helping poor
people who could not help themselves, but truly fearful that an upsurge
in welfare payments compelled by judicial or administrative decisions
would bring legislative wrath upon the slender pocketbooks of the poor.
The great question beyond the amount of the grant, beyond the
particular condition under which a welfare grant may be withdrawn,
is whether there is in fact a "right to life" in our civilization. When
earlier this year the New York Times, in an article reminiscent of
Schlesinger's mining families, quoted a Mississippi mother of nine as
saying that "We have pinto beans and bread. That's all for supper," 29
and when on the same day the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare said he is ordering a speed up of efforts to investigate the
causes and extent of malnutrition in America, surely a "right to life"
is overdue. Surely, in the words of a very tired chestnut, there ought to
be a law.
Another cluster of problems that face the poor man has to do
generally with living conditions. Within the boundaries of most large
cities, there are several areas where the standard of housing drops
sharply. The quality of municipal services falls off in the same precipitate way, and where well-paved roads become rutty dirt paths, legal
services attorneys are beginning to see constitutional issues.30 Another
group of issues arises with respect to discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing. New legislation 3 ' and decisions32 have come on the
books in the last year in this area, but they want implementation. Still
other issues concern the standards and procedures for admission to
public housing. For example, may the moral or political life of an applicant for a publicly built apartment be taken into consideration in
29 N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1969, at 1, col. 6. See Shenker, Guarantee of "Right to Life"
is Urged, id., Sept. 28, 1969, § 1, at 40, col. 3.
30 See, e.g., Arrington v. City of Fairfield, - F.2d (5th Cir. 1969) (granting
standing on a complaint charging that displacement in the absence of adequate relocation
housing would deny thirteenth and fourteenth amendment right, as well as alleging
discriminatory denial of municipal services); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment
Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (upholding the right of displacees to sue as a class).
31 Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-31 (Supp. 1969).
32 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See also Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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accepting or denying that request?. 8 In other -cases involving landlords.
and tenants, lawyers for poor tenants are using recent scholarship -to
support complaints theorizing that abuses perpetrated by "slumlords"
are tortious. 34 For example, legal services attorneys are suing a Chicago

landlord to compel him to repair an apartment in which they allege
children were poisoned by lead from peeling paint and broken plasterA Tenants also are claiming that it is unlawful to evict them in
retaliation for their charges of housing code violations. 6 Under a statute allowing the withholding of a month's rent, they are seeking to
establish that they may make monthly payments for major repairs totaling four months' worth, so long as their monthly installments to the
repairman do not exceed the rent for any one month.
In the area of the law merchant, lawyers for the poor have been
attacking various aspects of overreaching. The inability of a party to
a contract to speak or write the language in which it is written is being
pleaded as a defense. Legal services attorneys for the poor of many
cities are handling impoverished clients' litigation against smoothtalking "home renovation" salesmen who charge exorbitant prices for
shoddy goods. Washington lawyers are attacking utility company practices, alleging excessive charges, discriminatory and arbitrary deposit
requirements and the assignment of credit ratings that vary widely by
geographic area. 37 A group of clients in the national capital area are
testing whether a new federal rule of procedure will allow them to sue
as a class against what they claim is the fraudulent conduct of a credit
company which advertises that it can reduce debts and rescue them
from creditor harassment.
The competing social interests involved in the problems of the
poor man's marketplace are difficult to resolve, and visceral reactions
33 See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 893 U.S. 268 (1969), in which the complainant
alleged that she was evicted for political activity in organizing other tenants. The case
resulted favorably for her in her second hearing in the Supreme Court, which said that
she was entitled at least to the reasons for her eviction.
34 See Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MicH. L. REv. 869 (1967).
35 Lest this appear a solitary piece of driftwood on the legal shore, it should be
pointed out that of 31,000 Chicago slum children screened in 1967, 757 were found to
have toxic levels of lead in their bodies. Lead Poisoning Attacked by Chicago LSP,
2 LAw rN AMnoN, March 1968, at 5. See also Unsuspected Lead Poisoning,TrAL, Feb.-Mar.
1969, at 58.
36 See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), in which a reversal was
secured for the tenant. Interestingly, she was represented by Brian Olmstead, quoted in

the text accompanying note 28 supra.
37 See Lewis v. Washington Gas Light Co., cited in WELrArE. L. BuLL., March 1969,
at 21 (summarizing order of D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm.).
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sympathetic to the poor client may not always withstand analysis. Although studies have shown that the poor do in fact pay more for their
goods,2 8 Elman in his journalistic treatment The Poorhouse State"
draws a sympathetic and compelling picture of the small slum grocer
who sells a slice of bologna at a time, working fourteen hours a day,
seven days a week for a very small profit margin in a high-risk neighborhood. The slum grocer may serve an important social function,
since poor people, lacking automobile transportation, are generally
forced to purchase food in their immediate neighborhood. Yet the fact
that slum markets raise their prices a day or two after the arrival of
welfare checks brings bitterness as well as a few extra dollars. With
other goods the poor lack the information and sophistication, as well
as the transportation, to seek competition on prices and, more importantly, credit beyond their neighborhoods. They rely in many ways on
slum merchants who charge prices and interest rates that are exorbitant in terms of what may be available a few miles away.40
The problems will not always be solvable with reference to legal
precedents and will require, ideally, a consultation of economic and
sociological literature which lawyers often have eschewed. One of my
students, whose efforts as a law intern helped put a relatively respectable loan company out of business, lamented to me that he was increasingly unsure of the social value of his action. For he knew that his
erstwhile clients would now turn to even more marginal operators
who would squeeze them even more brutally. At the end of the complicated involutions of these problems is the need for a fundamental
and comprehensive revision of the law-but when one speaks of a true
solution, one speaks of the abolition of poverty. And one is forced
back upon the ad hoc, single-problem-oriented way that lawyers do
things. Yet, as the Cahns have reminded us, there are choices to be
made as to how lawyers spend their time, and the area of the modern
law merchant presents serious questions bearing on that kind of allocation.
Another vitally significant category of issues concerns the right of
access to the legal process itself. Poor men's lawyers are contending successfully that poor persons cannot be said to have "slept on their rights"
in failing to pursue a lawsuit because they could not afford an attorney.
8 E.g., D. CAPLOVrrz, THE PooR PAY MoRE (1963).
R. ELMAN, THE PooRHousE STATE 215-80 (1968).
40 One of my students, a former used car salesman, explains that the reliance becomes a psychological one in part, noting that the minority-group teenagers in Austin
"just love" a used car dealer who is most notorious among attorneys who must try to
bail poor customers out of his legal quicksand.
89
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They are attacking financial barriers to the securing of divorces and
are seeking the removal of bond requirements as a prerequisite to suits
41
defending against eviction.
From the battle fronts on which these cases are being fought there
have arisen more special issues within the ranks of legal services attorneys. Given the premises of the need to make equal protection a living
thing throughout the law, and the need for the law to encourage a
fearless supply of legal services to the poor, questions inevitably are
posed as to the legitimate concerns of counsel for the poor. Although
sneers about divorces representing a band-aid approach are bottomed
on powerful arguments, the need for a divorce may represent the biggest problem in an impoverished client's life, and his ability to get it
42
may be tied very closely with his general respect for the legal system.
Yet one longs for an expanded role for the legal services lawyer, desires
him to function on behalf of poor communities as house counsel does
for a corporation. For example, large industries have on occasion
exercised their muscle in communities in whose economic life they
43
play a significant part, and effectively have integrated their housing.
The kind of negotiation necessary to produce this result when the
key parties may be willing but reticent has been historically the job
of the lawyer. And indeed the wealthier citizens in our society use
lawyers on behalf of formalized groups for just this kind of private
negotiation. But, even agreeing that this function is appropriate to his
job,44 how far does it take the poverty lawyer? Does it lead him to
challenging residency rules and taking them to the Supreme Court if
need be, a general Galahad on behalf of thousands of welfare clients?
Does it drive him to lobbying for expanded welfare benefits at the
state level, or guaranteed income plans at the federal?
In determining the proper role of the legal services lawyer, it must
41

But a recent suit has been unsuccessful at the state supreme court level. State v.

Sanks, 225 Ga. 88, 166 S.E2d 19 (1969).
This kind of activity does not take place without gut-fighting response. The Governor

of California, for instance, has railed against a successful legal services operation in that
state, claiming that its representation of poor people in suits against state agencies should
be prohibited--even though the foundation of these lawsuits is that the agencies are

acting illegally.
42

Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 57 Misc. 2d 416, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1969), holding that

the city of New York should pay publication fees for an indigent party in a divorce
action.
43 See Lowe, Race, Jobs and Cities: What Business Can Do, SATURDAY RavIav, Jan.
11, 1969, at 27, 30, 91-92.
44 It should be remembered that there are more starving children in Mississippi.
than there are lawyers to take their individual cases to under-funded welfare agencies
and to unsympathetic courts.
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be borne in mind that his services may themselves create problems.
One does not want a totally litigious world, with clients running about
asserting incredible grievances stemming from imagined violations of
diaphanous rights. A friend of mine who is an attorney for a state
agency recently wrote me that legal services attorneys in his state were
buzzing about tying up all kinds of governmental machinery with inadequately drawn complaints based on pie-in-the-sky theories. But although we do not want a world full of litigation, we do say that people
should have their rights, and that their financial condition should be
neutral in the determination of those rights, both as to access to services
and the decision on substantive grounds. A related problem-and one
that will not be downed easily-arises when the party opposing
the poor client is not a state agency but a private party, not impoverished but not wealthy either. Legal services attorneys have not
failed to notice that they may squeeze such adversaries unmercifully
in cases involving money just above the small claims level-the choice
is to hire an attorney to stay in court for more time than the case is
worth, or to give up on what is in some cases a meritorious position.
However the question of whether poverty lawyers should work on
a small or a grand scale is resolved, there are further problems arising
from their potential role as publicists. It is a cardinal principle of
jurisprudence that the law be known. But all too often this is not the
case when the legal position of the indigent is involved. 45 Educating
people in the existence of the most fundamental rights, if done by
lawyers, may run afoul of condemnations of solicitation of legal business, even though the cases may not involve the generation of fees. The
kind of education that is unnecessary for wealthier potential clients
may be thought by old-line lawyers to be "stirring up litigation"
among the poor- and yet it may be a prerequisite to the realization
of equal protection. 46
45 It was necessary for me to write three letters, one to a United States Senator, to
flush from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare its Handbook of Public
Assistance, one of the fundamental documents in the welfare area. Two of my students
have had similar problems in keeping up to date with revisions of state welfare regulations:
An even greater obstacle to the preparation of an effective appeal is that the
Manual [of the Texas Welfare Appeals system] itself frequently does not contain
up-to-date information. It is supplemented at frequent intervals by Departmental executive or "E" letters that delineate the latest policy changes, and
although these memoranda are eventually incorporated into the Manual, they
are not included when a Manual is checked out.
Comment, Texas Welfare Appeals: The Hidden Right, 46 TExAs L. R v. 223, 241 (1967).
46 The A.B.A. Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards attacks this
problem directly in its new draft code. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RYSPONSiBiLiTY § 2-102
(1969) (Preliminary Draft).
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LAW AND THE POOR
CONCLUSION

the special problems of poor Americans are the problems of us
all; we are linked together indissolubly by a common destiny. It is
traditional to support that statement with words flavored with the
notion that equality is the essence of the American dream, and that
we fail to realize that dream as we fall short of that goal. But although
I feel much that way in my heart, let me suggest that the dependence
we all have on one another is rather more practical. When legal
services attorneys attack poor people's problems as consumers, they
are setting the foundation for greater protection of us all, for in our
role as purchasers of products in this impersonal and technical
economy, we are all as powerless in many ways as are poor people
generally. Indeed, the movement which has brought expanded legal
services to many poor Americans raises serious questions about the
availability of legal services to all of us. Although there is argument
that the middle class has solved the problem of buying justice,47 the
recent testimony of a lawyer in a letter to the HarvardLaw Record"
points out that in many cases it is the middle class that has significant
problems in affording that commodity. "Many good rights die on
the vine," he wrote concerning commercial problems, "because they
cannot be handled on a contingency." The increasing availability of
legal services should serve to hasten the day when equal justice-and
more justice-will rule the relations between all Americans. Further,
the push for more justice for the poor necessarily will bring into the
public eye-as it is doing already-serious questions about the economic allocations our governments are making. The questions of whether
municipal services will be uniformly provided or expressways flung
through the modest homes of the poor without adequate planning
for relocation have broad implications throughout our national life.
Municipal services or moon shots raise at bottom a question of justice.
When a great American judge said that the first commandment
of our legal system is that we shall not ration justice, he was not indulging cheap sentiment. Checking the abuse of government power
and preventing encroachments on human dignity are problems for
everyone in an increasingly complex society. The quality of equality
under the law is not only an abstract constitutional concept but a
practical crucial determinant of the nature of our national existence.
The question of what we as the ultimate governors are willing to
invest in justice is one that truly affects us all.
47 See p. 49 supra.
48 Letter from M. Arthur Auslander to Harvard Law Re"odDect1,'1968,atf' 9,IUGon file in 47 HAvAw LAw Rcow) No. 10.
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